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Israfel Peralogue | joined 16 October 2007 | 55 posts


"Murderous Children" posted 16 October 2007 in The Great Ordeal [supposed]"Murderous Children" by Israfel, Peralogue

Ok, I'm new here, but just thought I'd offer my two pence here. Apologies if it's a bit presumptive to jump in here...

If it had just been 'murderous child' I would actually have assumed it was Kellhus' child with Esmi, although it could be either, whether they've been trained in the ways of the Dunyain or not - They would have to be convinced of Kellhus' divinity to be of use to him (think Moe-elder and the rest of them being a danger - with Dunyain training they'd be in the same position), and indoctrinating them in his divine nature before they're conditioned would probably impede their conditioning, possibly making conditioning impossible. So I see them as probably limited to only being as competent as Maithenet if they're not to turn on Kellhus. However it turns out though I'm intrigued to see how the author will resolve that issue.

As a side point there, if they have some of the Dunyain ruthlessness, that could be at the heart of any antagonism between the two children, or at least fuel it. Perhaps doubts over Moe junior's parentage might give rise to thoughts from the younger one that Moe's not fit to carry on the mantle, not being a real Anasûrimbor and/or not quite as competent...

I'm not sure I'd agree with Madness that Kellhus will be softened and made wiser by his emotions. Remember that emotions aren't all soft and cuddly... And even people whose emotions are strong can be cold and ruthless in pursuing the goals their emotions dictate. Do you think Kellhus would pass up a greater chance to defeat the No-God by not using his children at all?

I actually incline towards the opinion of Moënghus (elder) - that Kellhus is actually mad, in one way or another. Given Kellhus' difficulties in predicting Cnaiür's actions due to his madness, it would be a way of standing outside the Dunyain's predictive ability while still being deluded into thinking he'd found an expanded Thousandfold Thought including himself as divinely inspired that placed him outside of the Dunyain's predictions and made him something more.

However, I'm definitely with Mysterious and others on the capabilities being fairly close - as has been stated, once freed from Scylvendi traditions Cnaiur's (self-taught) intelligence and perception was astounding, and his reflexes startled Kellhus. So while the Dunyain blood may give the natural child the edge, I'd say Moe jnr isn't going to be very far behind... view post


Your First Time posted 22 October 2007 in Off-Topic DiscussionYour First Time by Israfel, Peralogue

Mmm, some interesting sounding things here, shall have to check them out. For me, definitely the Book of the New Sun by Gene Wolfe. Absolutely amazingly well crafted book with an engaging main character, great storyline, subtle points to consider and with random words for things that you can actually look up if confused... view post


Finished TTT today - my thoughts... Holy War as training - posted 08 November 2007 in The Thousandfold ThoughtFinished TTT today - my thoughts... Holy War as training - by Israfel, Peralogue

Quote: "Callan S.":1tbch80l

Anyway, in terms of the war remember Moenghus realised the spiritual world (or whatever you'd call it) existed - and that by killing enough people, the link to it could be severed. Removing the potential for salvation...and more importantly, damnation. And Moenghus knew he was damned. The war was the first staging ground of mass butcherings for this purpose.[/quote:1tbch80l]

Ok, I'll have to go back to the book to be sure, but I'm pretty sure this was Kellhus's reasoning about why Moenghus had to die - because he would realise this, not because he had. In fact, I got the distinct impression that Moenghus was going "wtf is he talking about?" when Kellhus went off on his "when you realise you're damned" speech. It's part of what he sees as Kellhus's madness, so I wouldn't agree that it was Moenghus's rationale for the holy war... view post


Free Will posted 08 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

I'm afraid I'm of the opinion that the question is a pointless one. Without accepting the idea of free will the whole background behind human interaction and one's idea of self ceases to have meaning - it literally is a question without meaning, because it negates both the self and others, and the world as seen through human eyes. I can't remember which philosopher it is, but the person I agree with most on this debate essentially says that even if determinism is true, it's not something that can mean anything to us because all our actions in effect are predicated on the truth of free will. It is impossible to truly believe or act as if free will doesn't exist, and is therefore irrelevent to pursue the matter of whether our actions are actually free.

Also if anyone mentions compatibilism they deserve a slap... view post


Free Will posted 08 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

Quote: "jub":2sy15dp9
Pointless because you don't like the answer? Or pointless because you fail to gain anything from it? The way I see it, I gain a whole lot from the discussion of free will, in the same way people gain a lot from their belief in a god. [/quote:2sy15dp9]

No, not pointless because I don't like the answer, I fully accept that people could get a whole range of subjective bonuses from the discussion of free will. What I don't think is that the question can have any real meaning (see my points below).

Quote: "jub":2sy15dp9

How does anything change by accepting that we have no free will?[/quote:2sy15dp9]

Quote: "jub":2sy15dp9
It isn't impossible to believe anything, I could wholeheartedly believe that the sun rotates around the earth; I could believe any number of things. I fail to see how my belief in the non-existence of free will changes anything.[/quote:2sy15dp9]

I think you're missing what I'm saying, which is that the way we regard people, and ourselves as people necessarily involves us believing that people are making their own choices and have responsibility for their actions. The way we think every day, the decisions we make, our judgements of others, our justifications to ourselves depend entirely upon the notion of ourselves as free beings. It is impossible to truly accept that you yourself are a robot-like being driven only by causal levers that you have no control over, and, I would suggest, to apply this to others and be an absolute solipsist in this way. The point is that the way we think and act every day depends absolutely on a whole range of assumptions that directly and indirectly assume the existence and force of free will in both yourself and others. Next time you have a negative thought about someone's decision, "I wouldn't have done that, that's a stupid thing to do" for example, you assume that you have a choice and that they do too, as they are morally/otherwise culpable for the action, which they would not be in any real way if determinism was true. So therefore, whether determinism is an actual fact or not, one cannot truly act as if it was true, and thus for me the question is literally a non-question. It is not one that the human mind and english language are equipped to deal with and cannot legitimately be answered in a way that affirms determinism given these contraints upon the human mind and our language, regardless of whether or not determinism is a fact. Hope that helps clarify the position I hold on this issue. view post


Free Will posted 12 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

It's true determinism isn't the only thing out there, but the forms of compatibilism I've seen all reduce the concept of "free will" or, in the more sophisticated forms, "choice", to something far less than the everyday understanding. To my mind denying this form of free will is what is in essence nonsensical in the most basic way. There literally is no honest way we can begin to consider ourselves without effective choice, for the reasons I've mentioned, and still less is there a way you could begin to apply that in social relations.

Therefore, since even were we able to seriously consider the idea of free will not actually existing (which I would argue against, as stated), it would not be something that would have any ramifications for social matters, and I'd call that a pretty perfect case of a non-question. A question that is possible, perhaps, semantically speaking but makes pretty much no sense investigating from any philosophical or sociological perspective beyond, perhaps, a mere thought experiment. So to me it's a question that's a little like Ryle's Category Error (e.g. someone being shown round all of Oxford University's colleges and buildings and saying afterwards, "yes, but can I please see the university, all I've seen are these colleges and facilities") - a basic error in mistaking a semantically possible quesion for one that actually makes sense.

I'm not sure what aspect of personal identity you're getting at, could you clarify? But I would mention that I'd probably come at it from a perspective much like Heidegger and perhaps Husserl; that the way we've become used to looking at ourselves in the world, that of a detached observer looking out onto a world of qualia, is a mistaken way of going about it. view post


Free Will posted 16 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

I suspect that the response doubters would leap at is that all that would be a test of is how and to what degree societies conditioned their citizens to cope with the unknown in its different forms. So perhaps someone from an incredibly remote (perhaps, say, prehistoric) tribe, who cast everything in terms of a rigidly ordered world where nothing changed and this was the uncontestable will of their god, would be utterly baffled by being plunged suddenly into modern western society, whereas someone from a more globalised culture, or even simply a more imaginative one, would be better prepared to deal with the situation. view post


Are depressed people more realistic? posted 17 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionAre depressed people more realistic? by Israfel, Peralogue

Ok, perhaps a slight change in direction, but the original statement sounds like it coulda come more or less out of Heidegger... He doesn't mean entirely the same thing I suspect, but the similarity amuses me nonetheless. For those interested;

Heidegger's idea is that we see everything through the context of the Mood we're in, and although the context of Mood isn't very well defined, he basically says that the way we see things in most moods is loaded with background assumptions - a chair is not just an inanimate lump of wood we have no clue about, but something to sit on, etc, but that this tendency leads us to forget that we're all actually locii of possibilies. So we tend to get along by doing things because that's what one does. One sits on the chair and not the table, and sits facing the teacher/lecturer/whatever in educational places.

And, to get to the point, he says that there's a certain Mood that makes us realise about the reality of the many possibilities that continually face us, a Mood that serves to shake us out of our everyday rut. This Mood is translated as 'Angst', or 'Anxiety' and has been compared to depression. So if you'd agree with him, then depressed people actually are getting closer to the reality of things. Of course, for Heidegger it is a state that passes, and I suspect that he'd agree that someone who felt it near-constantly would not be better off for it... view post


Free Will posted 18 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

That's pretty much a statement of the more plausible compatibalist theories I've heard. But I can't see how you can argue that the mere act of making a choice can be free if there's no way you could or would ever make a different choice - that seems to me to be reducing the concept of free will far below any rational use of the phrase; saying that you have a choice but will (and can) never choose any other way is to me simply a more dishonest version of determinism. 'Choice' in those terms is not a choice at all. I understand your point about reasons playing the predominant, but in the process of deliberation, one may weigh many reasons against another, and the ability to judge either above the another at a certain moment I would not call random chance.

To toss out an example (forgive me if it's overly complex or mildly retarded), if one supposes a case where one is deciding whether to condemn a murderer to death or life imprisonment, there may well be many varying reasons for either side. And while one's past experiences will necessarily have influenced how one views the options, I would suggest that to say that one would always make the same decision is to believe wholeheartedly in determinism - and if that's your point of view you'd do best to leave free will out of your conception at all. However, to believe in the concept of free will, and the possibility of either choice being made, is not to say that it comes down to random chance. It's a case of making a decision that is informed by and probably strongly influenced by the past and reasons, but not being utterly constrained by them.

So in this example I can recognise (for example) my great fury at this murderer for killing someone, who perhaps reminds me of a person who killed a relative of mine, and that society would be better off with this person dead, thus. causing me to want to put the killer to death. I can feel there are compelling reasons to put this man to death. However, I nonetheless recognise that the evidence is not entirely fool-proof and perhaps I believe that rehabilitation works better as a penal system than simply locking them away. Or perhaps balancing these reasons I simply weigh up the concept of justice against mercy. The reasons do not change, but which ones I ultimately accept as more convincing is something that I can debate in my mind and decide on through deliberation. The fact that reasons exist and provide motivation does not therefore mean that these reasons compel us to accept them.

So I would agree that causes are very often found within our character, but deny the assertion that these causes shackle us to a certain path. And it is that assertion that I believe stands at the centre of the point I made earlier about the lack of sense in asking the question as we do.

Added to that, I'd add that the principles of causality aren't quite as rock-solid at their foundation as we'd like to believe. Tossing out things I'm definitely not the best person to elaborate on (but hoping you take the point in the spirit in which it's offered), quantum theory and the idea that if you ran into a wall enough times, theoretically you'd eventually pass through it (something to do with alignment of particles or the like, I believe - sue me, not a scientist...) alone should make us pause and think that perhaps we should not take as coldly mechanical a point of view as I would suggest is taken in the above post.

Okay, that was possibly an overlong way of saying, "good points, but I still disagree". Beg pardon. I'll try to think on it some more and come up with some points that will perhaps do your argument more justice. view post


Free Will posted 21 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

Quote: "Randal":3emwejj1
The problem is, I fail to see the distinction. The causes do not shackle us to a certain path?

What -then- are your choices based on? If you choose to execute the murderer in your example, why? And if next you do not, why not?[/quote:3emwejj1]

The answer here would be, the way I see it, if you choose to execute the murderer, that would be because you let your anger overcome your beliefs, or upheld one reason for doing it over another. There are motivating reasons that could push you either way.

Quote: "Randal":3emwejj1
Why would you choose differently if the circumstances are the same? I honestly see no reason why anybody ever would. Or should. What meaning do our choices have, after all, if they can change... for no discernable reason?[/quote:3emwejj1]

You would choose differently because you have reasons on both sides, that often struggle against each other. What tips the balance can be many things, a surge of anger, a moment of clarity or inspiration that comes to you regarding the morality of your acts, a resolution one way or the other that depends on your volition and will-power.

It seems to me that you're assuming that people's reasons for doing things are always reasonable. Which is blatently untrue - someone might kill another for sport, stop an argument by force because they're bored, do something they regret later while angry, depressed and so forth, and so I can see many reasons why people would make different decisions given the same reasons and time to reason in.

Quote: "Randal":3emwejj1
However, I also think that your deliberations would bring you to the same result in the end in any and all possible paralel universes provided the circumstances remain the same. You would think the same thoughts and arrive at the same conclusions. Why? Simply, because you are doing the best you can given your capacities. So you always choose what you think best or most pleasant, etc.[/quote:3emwejj1]

This strikes me to be so overly optimistic I'm astounded - and I'm a liberal and oft-time optimist myself. People don't always do what they think is best or most pleasant. People often drift through life without thinking, without challenging social norms with their beliefs even when they're deliberating. People often do things they regret, sometimes only seconds later, and to say that they were doing the best they could according to their capacities strips away any kind of notion of moral responsibility you could possibly have. If everyone is doing the best they can, and it's the only thing they can, or ever could, do, there's no way on earth you could possibly blame them.

As well as 'choice' being bereft of meaning in your interpretation, then, you also have stripped the idea of responsibility for one's actions of any kind of relevence. If all we are doing is determined by internal systems of reasoning within our head, and these in turn are caused by a multitude of other factors, also unable to be anything but determined by their causes, then you are left with full blown determinism and no matter how much you claim it for this theory, the idea of 'choice' and, as mentioned above, 'responsibility' has no place within it. We might have an illusion of choice, but this in no way affects the fact that there's no way you can legitimately blame, criticise, praise, appreciate anyone, and many other things besides. All you are doing is acting out the result of many causal levels upon your brain. I'm not sure determinists and compatibalists realise the extent to which they are attempting to strip the world of meaning...

Quote: "Randal":3emwejj1
I suppose I am not very much hung up on the question of whether the choice is "free" or not. I don't care, as long as I am still exercising judgement, still trying to find the best path. That to me is a lot more relevant than any ephermeal concept of "free will."[/quote:3emwejj1]

But this is exactly what you're not doing by your account... You are not "exercising" judgement at all. Your brain is merely following a path laid out for it in advance, and your brain is simply experiencing something that is essentially an illusion of judgement. No analysis is taking place, no choice is the end result, that isn't entirely set up in advance - because the importance of different reasons is set by your experiences (and can't change, which is the key point in your argument), things that have caused you to think in certain ways determine what you'll do in advance, and so you're no more "trying to find the best path" and "exercising judgement" than a robot programmed to move in certain ways.

Quote: "Randal":3emwejj1
PS: Quantum theory is a nice one, often pushed forward by people advocating free will. Unfortunately, quantum universe does not support a truly free will either, as all it allows for in the way of undetermined events is random chance.[/quote:3emwejj1]

I'm not saying quantum theory on its own proves free will. What I'm saying is that the purely deterministic and mechanical conception of the universe has taken a hit with Quantum theory - why shouldn't it take another hit by acknowledging free will <!-- s:wink: --><img src="{SMILIES_PATH}/icon_wink.gif" alt=":wink:" title="Wink" /><!-- s:wink: --> I'm sure finding new laws for it would be difficult, but not necessarily impossible. That's conjecture of course, but I'm essentially pulling a Hamlet without resorting to religion; &quot;There are more things in heaven and earth...&quot; etc.

But also, I personally wouldn't be averse to a conception of consciousness in which the role of chance played its part. Why shouldn't things like inspiration, of whatever kind (musical, artistic, social), genuinely new ideas that strike out of the blue, and perhaps other things too, have a certain element of chance? Maybe (to take it further, though I wouldn't necessarily agree with the following) your account of having to act a certain way is true, but certain realisations only come to me randomly, and it is this randomness that causes parallel universes. And what would be wrong with this compared to your purely mechanical version where we can do nothing but what we do? Either way we have no genuine control over our actions, but in one version those actions are fixed and in others there's a degree of chance. It seems to me you have no legitimate way of criticising one without criticising the other. view post


Logos is theft posted 21 November 2007 in The Warrior ProphetLogos is theft by Israfel, Peralogue

Not sure I'm getting the way people are construing the issue here, but the way I saw it, the Logos, or rather the Dunyain's use of it to make the rest of the world their slaves rather than just &quot;slaves of the world&quot; (as they put it) was not so much theft - though they are certainly stealing other's usual volition, as far as that goes - as getting ignoring/doing away with a problem of morality that crops up sometimes; that there is a difference for you morally between killing someone yourself and letting them die. Or of someone else killing someone or you killing them. It says if someone else isn't as aware of their actions as you, or if their actions can be manipulated by you instead of by events that just happen, you are fully justified in taking advantage of that and using any means to achieve your aims. So I'd say the theft comes from a deeper source really... view post


Free Will posted 22 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

Quote: &quot;jub&quot;:mz77zt58
So how does this make us any less of a 'robot programmed to move in certain ways'? Are you suggesting at some point in your judgement you way up the possible decisions, and act on what you feel is best? So to put it crudely, you systematically eliminate possible decisions until you find the most probable action for success. Or do you somehow avoid using any form of judgement in your decision making?[/quote:mz77zt58]

Not sure I understand the question you're asking here; The reason you wouldn't be like a robot if you had free will would be the existence of a genuine choice. Battling internal causes that depend on an exercise of will, or at least acquiescence of an intellect with the capacity for choice, to motivate action is the very opposite of a robot. Hence my confusion with your question.

Judgement is of course exercised in choice, but it is not the systematic elimination of possibilities whereby we eventually come to one answer - that seems to me to be what is being suggested in the deterministic/mechanical conceptions of human action. Nor, I would argue, is it simply the stronger feeling that wins out. We decide which arguments persuade us, or at least whether we act upon the contradictary dictates of our different feelings and rational judgements (which both often conflict amongst aspects of themselves as well as each other), and to conceive of judgement in the above ways seems to me to be demonstrably incorrect and overly simplistic, as well as condemning one to a coldly deterministic world whereby you're placed in the odd predicament of having to disbelieve in meaning while living in a world full of it...

I would say one's judgement is composed of many aspects, both emotional and rational, with some of those aspects hidden even to ourselves at first glance as well as the usual elements we are aware of.

When we are considering whether to give money to a beggar, there's (for example) the sympathy we feel for another being in distress, the consideration that they might spend the money on booze, any moral code we follow that might dictate kindness to strangers or those in need, perhaps even a feeling of mild revulsion at their appearance, which we might not even admit to ourselves. These all combine in different ways, and then you get onto issues of self-analysis, or aims you have (other uses for the money?) and other beliefs about society, yourself, and so forth. These combines to form various arguments for and against. How you finally act, what final weight you give to them is what I would suggest is not (and cannot sensibly) be determined. Do you side with certain feelings over others (revulsion vs empathy), rational reasons over others (giving money to charity vs money that will help individuals now), all of which have a certain weight beforehand in your mind, perhaps, but with the myriad interpretations and complexity (as well as lack of certainty) it's nothing so simple as weighing two scale in your head and the result that wins dictates your actions.

God, listen to me ramble on. Apologies if my replies aren't always amazingly insightful, but I'm still exploring the issue myself and trying to weigh up what I actually think as well as argue the point <!-- s:) --><img src="{SMILIES_PATH}/icon_smile.gif" alt=":)" title="Smile" /><!-- s:) --> view post


Free Will posted 29 November 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

An action is free (in the sense of free will) if in making a decision about actions, there is a genuine choice about which action we will in fact take. If there is not an actual sense in which another decision could have been made then the action is purely determined by other factors, both inside yourself and out - you put in certain stimuli and through a complex reaction inside of you (elements of which are structural and all of these are themselves determined by outside factors according to a determinist viewpoint) a certain action results. Essentially mine is a conception of action in which the consciousness has a choice to make, and can genuinely decide which way to go. Further ideas of mine about how the internal process works I included in my posts above. view post


Free Will posted 02 December 2007 in Philosophy DiscussionFree Will by Israfel, Peralogue

Then there's no genuine choice or decision being made, because everything about the decision is predetermined - it's saying that our consciousness runs down predetermined paths, so there is no way that person can genuinely make the decision to do another thing. Therefore determinism can't say that the consciousness has a choice and a genuine decision to make. Our consciousness might believe that it has the decision, but would not actually have it if there was never any possibility that another action would take place.

The idea of a genuine decision nowhere enters determinism, because by the model you give, we must accept that past habits of thinking and information of which we are aware completely control how our thoughts will go and which decision we will make. This is clearly not compatible with the idea of a genuine choice to be made by our consciousness; In that case our consciousness is like a cog in a machine that can only turn one way given the pressures put on it. I'm struggling to see how one would conceive of this as anything resembling an actual choice (beyond the simple impression that you're making a choice). view post


Who is most offensive. posted 03 December 2007 in Literature DiscussionWho is most offensive. by Israfel, Peralogue

My favourite offensive bit in Terry Goodkind is when the main character is dissing a mildly disabled person begging for food for his children, responding to his plea for money with &quot;well, your bad back obviously didn't prevent you from having children, did it?&quot;. His constant wittering on about his anti-religion-and-communist-and-fascist-and-anything-I-hate polemics did annoy me by the end of the series.

As a bit of a fan of Heinlein, I didn't find his stuff offensive, I just think he went a bit soppy at the end with his universe as myth stuff - since they exist somewhere else, it would be terrible not to have them live happily ever after. Also, a lot of the writing in that series isn't nearly as good as his other works. But I'm in agreement with Dassem Ultor that he was writing about stuff that was totally out there from his cultural stand-point, and in exploring those taboos was raising a lot of interesting points, which he does fairly tastefully (if not always well). Plus I'm a sucker for redheads.

Haven't read any Hubbard but I assume I'd hate him.

And the Seer King stuff I thought was mostly harmless. A little overly teenage, but harmless. view post


Just finished Thousandfold Thought posted 05 December 2007 in The Thousandfold ThoughtJust finished Thousandfold Thought by Israfel, Peralogue

Quote: &quot;JGoose&quot;:1pmtmz1t
2. I got the idea that Kellhus brought about the &quot;Apocalypse&quot; with the end of the old ways and the beginning of the new ways under the new Aspect-Emperor Kellhus. But with all of this...where does the Consult and the No-God fit in? I understand Kellhus's apocalypse is a metaphorical apocalypse but I was expecting a big showdown between Achiamian and Kellhus vs. the No-God...was anybody else?
[/quote:1pmtmz1t]

Erm, I think that the actual second Apocalypse is still to come... The Thousandfold Thought isn't the last book that follows this storyline, it's just the last in the first trilogy. So I'd expect the No-God to make an appearance eventuallly. There are loads of people here who can answer the other questions far better than I can, so I'll leave it to them to do so. view post


R Jordan passed away posted 06 December 2007 in Literature DiscussionR Jordan passed away by Israfel, Peralogue

Book 10 was so-so, but book 11 was fantastic. It's just terribly sad that he died before he could finish 12. I suspect leaving a grand project unfinished must be one of the worst things that could happen to an artist. view post


Any up coming Novels with entirety Of THe Apocalypse? posted 11 December 2007 in Author Q &amp; AAny up coming Novels with entirety Of THe Apocalypse? by Israfel, Peralogue

I for one am not disappointed in the least by the sci-fi/fantasy mix that seems set up. Bakker could easily make this series into something as great as the Book of the New Sun, which is an example of how to mix the two well, and the magic seems real enough so I'm happy...

And I'd imagine that any questions that are left unanswered could easily be answered by a prequel of some description, possibly a set of short stories or something. I'm confident we'll be happy by the end, though obviously more reading material is always good <!-- s:) --><img src="{SMILIES_PATH}/icon_smile.gif" alt=":)" title="Smile" /><!-- s:) --> view post


Just finished Thousandfold Thought posted 11 December 2007 in The Thousandfold ThoughtJust finished Thousandfold Thought by Israfel, Peralogue

Though what the book directly states is at least ambiguous enough to have spawned this topic... view post


Top 10 list of things to do while waiting on Great Ordeal. posted 12 December 2007 in The Great Ordeal [supposed]Top 10 list of things to do while waiting on Great Ordeal. by Israfel, Peralogue

Maybe get a quick shot off while trying it on in a shop? Then everyone can see your new affiliation...

American sports stuff is confuzzling. view post


Pulp Fiction (No, not the movie) posted 13 December 2007 in Literature DiscussionPulp Fiction (No, not the movie) by Israfel, Peralogue

Wasn't stuff like the Barsoom originally pulp fiction? Astoundings and the like. I really need to read more of the pulps... view post


Cnaiur question posted 21 December 2007 in The Warrior ProphetCnaiur question by Israfel, Peralogue

Can't recall the broken pieces reference, but the someone he's forgetting to hate is surely Kellhus? view post


Why did the Dunyain learn how to fight? posted 03 January 2008 in Author Q &amp; AWhy did the Dunyain learn how to fight? by Israfel, Peralogue

Well, I saw it as partly a side-effect of their philosophical system, partly a way to test that under extremely distracting conditions and partly a way to protect themselves and their way of life should they be discovered at some point in the future - a form of insurance as they are essentially creatures of rationality and wouldn't get as complacent as others might in their situation... view post


Are Humans aliens on this world. posted 05 January 2008 in The Thousandfold ThoughtAre Humans aliens on this world. by Israfel, Peralogue

That would be &quot;raises the question&quot;...

/pedantry

It could just that the Inchori landed there because there was life on it when they came across it... view post


Is Kellhus really a prophet? posted 12 January 2008 in The Thousandfold ThoughtIs Kellhus really a prophet? by Israfel, Peralogue

Quote: &quot;Mandati Wannabe&quot;:2y5knz62
And finally, the haloes on his hands, which everybody who believes he's a prophet sees, sometimes constantly, usually in glimpses.

However, after reading this wonderful trilogy for the fourth time, I noticed one little line in TWP that made this whole theory come crashing down for me..... When Serwe is getting raped/interrogated by the skin-spy posing as Kellhus, she still sees the haloes around his hands

Could this simply be a mass hallucination? As in, everybody sees these haloes because they want to see some visible sign of him being a prophet, stemming from a belief that Inri Sejenus had haloed hands as well?
[/quote:2y5knz62]

Although I thought Akka also saw the halos even though he didn't believe Kellhus was a prophet... I'd have to reread it to be sure though. view post


Logos is theft posted 12 January 2008 in The Warrior ProphetLogos is theft by Israfel, Peralogue

Yeh, it's a totally silly point of view though... People die every day, killed by the world in earthquakes and such. Many are killed by other people in many different situations. All of which detracts not a jot from the fact that you're still morally responsible when you yourself kill them. Agency is a pretty key concept in moral thought... view post


Kelhus vs ... posted 21 January 2008 in The Thousandfold ThoughtKelhus vs ... by Israfel, Peralogue

Quote: &quot;Warrior-Poet&quot;:3icams9p
The only person that could probably defeat Kellhus, is someone from the Dune series, whether it be the Bene Gesserit, a mentat, Paul Muad'Dib, or one of his various descendants, in a universe where manipulation is everyone's game and nearly everyone is a super genius he would be doomed[/quote:3icams9p]

Kinda agree - I'd only give even odds on Paul Muad'Dib though. The fact that he has the weirding way, the great control (with Voice) and can see into the future(s) just about counteract the dunyain conditioning, analysis and mandate sorcery in my book. Even if the other people in the Dune series were able to resist his manipulation, he'd tear them to pieces with sorcery before they got close. I suppose a Bene Gesserit mother who also possessed the great control might stand a bit of a chance though.

I actually can't think of anyone else I'd send against Kellhus - the whole sorcery being a violation of reality kinda suggests to me that even gods/spirits etc wouldn't stand too much of a chance given Kellhus can adjust to read intention in the smallest of actions (even if some could keep emotion off their face, simple physical action and patterns of behaviour tell him bags), is an absolute master swordsman because he doesn't rely on skill but placing himself in the correct moment (kinda an advanced form of the void from WoT), as well as his ridiculously powerful sorcery.

I'd place something close to even odds if he was jumped, though - by an Aes Sedai/Ashaman who wasted no time for example... view post


Maithanet posted 21 January 2008 in The Judging EyeMaithanet by Israfel, Peralogue

Bear in mind that Maithenet had 20 years of following his father's directives; is it not likely that either he recognised the validity of the TTT (not necessarily had grasped it himself, but was prepared to follow someone who had), or that Moenghus had indoctrinated him at some level to enable him to be controlled by an actual Dunyain? Either he's been used to following a 'real' Dunyain as the possessor of a truth that's beyond him, or he's able to be manipulated. I don't really see any other reason for him going along with Moenghus's plans for his whole life given he's had some Dunyain training himself... view post


The Judging Eye posted 22 January 2008 in The Judging EyeThe Judging Eye by Israfel, Peralogue

I'm just getting flashbacks to that penny arcade strip, personally. And yes, hurrah for there being three books instead of 2. Can't wait. view post


What drove Kellhus mad? posted 25 January 2008 in The Thousandfold ThoughtWhat drove Kellhus mad? by Israfel, Peralogue

It was the time on the Circumfix, I'm pretty sure.

Moenghus, when he meets Kellhus, says his probablity trance failed him at that point, and comments a little later that he didn't forsee that it would break him rather than enlighten him.

It's from that point onwards that he starts to see halos around himself, I believe. Although I personally am coming round to the view that being mad, he has opened himself to the outside and the divine (see Cnaiur's report of what Akka says about the connection between madness and divinity), I'd say it was definitely that point (when he weeps onwards, essentially) that he starts going mad, and the voices convince him of 'destiny' and that damnation and salvation are facts. view post


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